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This paper addresses the challenges facing China in accelerating the pace of rural-urban 
migration as part of its on-going economic development programme. It explains the push 
and  pull  influences  on  migration  and  in  particular  explains  why  a  continuing  focus  on 
urbanisation is justified by the very large gap between rural and urban incomes and the 
relatively  higher  income  elasticity  of  demand  for  urban-based  goods  and  services.  The 
provision of affordable housing is an integral part of this structural shift programme. The 
paper thus considers the most appropriate ways in which housing finance can be mobilised, 
and thence how both the quality and the affordability of the housing stock can be increased. 
Positive  and  negative  lessons  for  China  are  offered  from  the  different  urbanisation 
experiences of Latin America (especially Colombia) and Singapore. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
China undoubtedly needs, and potentially can sustainably afford, a continuing massive boost 
to its urban residential construction sector, at an even higher rate than the overall impressive 
annual average achieved in this field in recent decades. Thirty years after switching to a 
more market-oriented economy, China has had an unprecedentedly high average annual 
rate of economic growth, attaining by 2008 a per capita income estimated at US$2,940 or 
US$6,020 in terms of purchasing power parity (World Bank, 2010). For countries at this level 
of development the typical proportion of the population living and working in urban areas is 
around 55% (Henderson 2009:6); but for China the proportion is much lower at only 44.9% 
in 2010 (United Nations, 2011). The proportion was less than 20% in 1980 at the start of 
China’s reform period (having risen little during the Maoist era from a mere 13% in 1950). 
Much has been achieved since then, but  while  rapid economic growth has  clearly  gone 
hand-in-hand with rapid urbanisation, until recently this has actually been at a significantly 
slower pace (3-4% per year) than the 5-6% rates typically achieved by other developing 
countries during their periods of rapid economic growth (Choi 2000; World Bank 2002). 
 
Choi (2000), Henderson (2009), World Bank (2009), Gao (2010) and many others highlight 
that this relatively modest record is partly due to legal restrictions on rural-urban migration 
associated with the well-known hukou system that has been motivated by a desire to avoid 
the crowded shanty-town slums and associated social unrest prevalent in many cities in 
Latin America, Africa and other parts of Asia.
2 One major consequence of these restrictions, 
however, is that the rural-urban income gap in China is one of the  widest in the developing 
                                                 
1 This paper is a revised version of a paper which the author prepared for the Asian Development 
Bank under a consultancy in May-July 2011. The views expressed in this paper are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Asian Development Bank or its 
Board of Governors or the governments they represent. 
 
2  Nevertheless,  according  to  the  Population  Reference  Bureau  (2010),  38%  of  China’s  urban 
population in 2005 lived in what are described as slums. (The comparable figure for Colombia was 
18%, and zero for Singapore.) 2 
 
world. Choi’s (2000) estimate for the World Bank put the gap at about 2.5:1 between 1978-
1998, and it appears that the gap has been widening since then: according to the World 
Bank (2010:66) it had risen from around 2.6 in 1999 to around 3.3 by 2006. 
 
Henderson (2009), for example, would ideally like to see the hukou system abolished on 
economic efficiency grounds but accepts that there must be a transition period to avoid rural-
urban migration at a pace that would add to the strains already experienced by the most 
attractive  cities.  A  first  step  could  be  to  relax  restrictions  at  the  provincial  level  before 
relaxing  them  nationally.  However,  the  more  that  decent  housing  and  jobs  for  potential 
migrants can be provided, the faster that hukou restrictions can be relaxed in an orderly 
fashion.  
 
This report seeks (i) to explain the general economic forces that lie behind these structural 
shifts,  and  (ii)  to  indicate  the  positive  and  negative  lessons  for  the  pace  and  pattern of 
house-building and urban design that China can gain from the experience (mainly but not 
exclusively)  of  two  countries,  Colombia  and  Singapore,  at  similar  stages  of  their 
development. 
 
2.  The main economic forces that drive urbanisation 
 
The shift in the structure and centre of gravity of countries as they develop economically is 
conventionally explained by grouping the influences into “push” and “pull” forces. However, 
the distinction is not clear-cut because of the way these forces interact on each other. One 
can speak of the distinct forces of supply and demand but it must be remembered that one 
person’s  or  one  sector’s  supply  is  ultimately  their  demand  for  the  goods  and  services 
provided by other people and sectors in exchange.  
 
Nevertheless,  consider  first  the  forces  on  the  side  of  demand.  In  the  early  stages  of 
development very low incomes force most people to spend the bulk of their subsistence 
incomes on food, basic clothing and basic shelter. Agriculture is then the dominant sector 
and  its  land-intensive  nature  forces  the  population  to  live  in  scattered  communities  that 
satisfy their basic needs at the level of the household or village, with relatively little market-
based  specialisation  and  exchange.  The  lack  of  specialisation  keeps  labour  productivity 
low.
3 As incomes grow, there is more money for food but the proportion spent on it tends to 
fall while it rises for other goods and services. This is the near -universal “Engel’s Law” that 
can  be  expressed  as  a  tendency  for  the  income-elasticity  of  demand  for  food  and  raw 
materials  to  be  significantly  less  than  unity  while  for  other  goods  and  services  it  is 
significantly higher (with the weighted sum of the elasticities adding up to unity). As supply 
responds to demand, so labour and capital gravitate – are “pulled” – toward the production of 
manufactured goods and related services such as transport, education and health. Village 
settlements expand if they can provide these more efficiently than on the farms; and as 
incomes  and  patterns  of  demand  alter  in  favour  of  non-agricultural  products  so  villages 
become towns and towns become cities that exchange more and more of their products for 
those of the farms and mines. 
 
Next consider the forces on the supply side. Advances in technical knowledge, experience, 
skill, capital accumulation and organisational and institutional change increase the direct and 
                                                 
3 Adam Smith (1776), in the opening chapters of The Wealth of Nations, famously considered that 
increased specialisation or division of labour is the most powerful way in which wealth increases, but 
that its extent is limited by the size of the market. For this reason his magnum opus was primarily an 
attack on prevailing mercantilist ideas and policies that restricted markets by setting the sectional 
interests of producers above those of consumers. To this end, Smith called for enhanced competition 
and mobility in both product and factor markets. The implications for policy on rural-urban migration 
should be obvious but remain controversial. 3 
 
indirect productivity of labour. Thanks to astonishing improvements linked with the Green 
Revolution over the last 50 years, actual and potential productivity gains have been more 
powerful in developing countries’ agriculture, including China’s, than in most other areas of 
their  economic  activity.  The  most  notable  gains  are  associated  with  new  high-yielding 
“miracle” seed varieties of rice, wheat and other crops that can increase output per acre and 
per person six-fold or more as compared with traditional varieties. Powerful gains can also 
be had from increased mechanisation and the complementary use of chemical fertilizers, 
pesticides, irrigation and drainage.  
 
Why,  then,  are  the  national  (as  opposed  to  best-practice)  statistics  on  agricultural 
productivity increases relatively disappointing in many developing countries, and what are 
the  implications  for  overall  economic  growth?  A  common,  apparently  “common-sense” 
answer is that there has been under-investment in this sector. A deeper answer seeks the 
reasons for this “under-investment” and notes that “markets clear at the short end”. That is, if 
productivity  and  potential  supply  increase  faster  than  the  increase  in  effective  market 
demand it follows that prices will fall until the increase in supply matches the slow increase in 
demand. The point is that although, by definition, productivity increases in agriculture reduce 
costs and that this usually reduces prices – especially in highly competitive agriculture – the 
low elasticity of demand for most foodstuffs and raw materials (even among poor people) 
means that the trend increase in demand for agricultural products is typically only a little 
greater than the growth of population – perhaps 3-4% a year in most developing countries or 
somewhat more in countries like China where overall growth of incomes is much higher. 
 
The conclusion is that it is a mistake to identify – as many commentators carelessly do – 
revolutionary  increases  in  productivity  with  an  increase  in  production  or  sales  or  farm 
incomes. When productivity increases outstrip production and sales, the lower prices of cost-
reducing innovators drive higher-cost non-innovators out of the market, forcing them either to 
retire  into  subsistence  farming  (where  they  continue  to  drag  down  the  national  labour 
productivity  statistics)  or  to  migrate  to  the  towns  and  cities  in  search  of  an  alternative 
livelihood. This is just as true if the productivity-enhancing innovations are in the form of (i) 
capital-intensive and labour-saving machinery such as tractors, bulldozers and combined 
harvesters or (ii) the greater use of labour-intensive inputs such as new yield-increasing 
seed varieties, fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation and drainage. The latter certainly enable much 
more to be planted and harvested on the farms where they are used, and these farms may 
well employ more labour as a result. But it is a common fallacy of composition to assume 
that what is true for the innovating farms is also true of the sector as a whole. Productivity 
increases on the more commercial, modernising farms (usually the larger ones with greater 
profits  and  access  to  credit)  capture  a  larger  and  larger  share  of  a  relatively  slowly 
increasing market demand. This again implies that the smaller, non-innovating farmers lose 
market share and are driven out. The net increase in overall farm output and measured 
average productivity thus is less – often much less – than the increase in production and 
productivity on the innovating farms where these are both increasing rapidly.  
 
This explains the “push” or labour-displacing effects on migration arising from the supply 
side of agriculture interacting with inelastic demand. An implication is that these effects can 
be exacerbated if government policy focuses on subsidies to agricultural investment rather 
than relying on the natural response of investors to actual market demand; and this is true 
even if the subsidies focus only on labour-intensive inputs.  
 
However,  it  is  important  also  to  recognise  the  simultaneous  “pull”  effects  of  increased 
agricultural productivity on the creation of urban employment opportunities. Lower costs that 
reduce food and raw material prices benefit consumers, especially those in urban work who 
do not rely on agriculture for their money incomes. Urban-sector employers can even reduce 
the real wages they need to pay to attract workers and this enables them to employ more 4 
 
workers  than  otherwise.
4  Higher  incomes  increase  the  absolute  demand  for  agricultural 
products, even though as a proportion it declines. If the resulting increases in farm incomes 
lead  to  higher  investment  in  that  sector,  the  impact  may  well  be  further  to  increase 
productivity ahead of the slowly increasing demand, thus further displacing labour in net 
terms because of the proportionately greater reduction in labour requirements per unit of 
output.    
 
The question then is whether this dynamic “pull” effect from rising agricultural productivity on 
urban employment dominates its “push” or labour-displacing effect. The fact that in very 
many countries, not least in China, the average rural-urban wage gap has not significantly 
narrowed is prima facie evidence that push has dominated pull, and that the pool of very 
low-productivity rural workers remains so high that there is little upward pressure on rural 
wages. This in turn keeps down the wages of the marginal, less skilled and experienced 
urban workers (mostly the recent immigrants) even as the increased concentration of labour 
in  more  densely  populated  cities  generates  the  agglomeration  economies  that  increase 
overall and average urban incomes, so widening the average rural-urban income gap. 
 
As mentioned, the overall price and income elasticities of demand for urban sector goods 
and services are greater than unity. This means that as urban productivity rises, the lower 
real  costs  and  prices  increase  expenditure  on  these  urban  products.  In  contrast  to 
agriculture,  this  has  a positive  impact  on  urban  employment  despite the  reduced  labour 
requirements per unit of output. The income elasticity of demand for urban services of all 
kinds  (transport,  distribution,  finance,  education,  health,  law,  administration  and 
entertainments)  is  often  somewhat  higher  than  for  urban  industrial  goods  while  the 
productivity-increasing potential in these activities is generally lower than in both agriculture 
and manufacturing. This combination explains why the share of services in both GDP and 
overall employment tends to increase as the economy grows. Similar comments could be 
made about the construction sector, but here the experience is mixed, for reasons to be 
examined in detail below.
5 
 
Given  the  expectation  of  strongly  positive  employment-generating  effects  from  the 
combination of productivity growth plus high demand elasticities in urban -based sectors, 
what are we to conclude if in practice the cities are failing to provide enough well-paying jobs 
for the large and growing absolute number of surplus workers who are either disguisedly 
unemployed  in agriculture or  severely  underemployed in the low -income urban informal 
sector?
6 It is that in agriculture the push effects are dominating its pull effects, and that the 
cities are failing to exploit fully the opportunities that this underemployment represents for a 
better utilisation of all available resources. 
 
Insofar  as  these  conditions  still  characterise  China’s  cities  despite  decades  of 
unprecedented  growth,  this  is  the  justification  for  an  even  greater  pace  of  urban 
                                                 
4 In reality most countries experience modest or high rates of general inflation, so that increased 
productivity seldom leads to an actual fall in money prices. Rather, prices rise less than otherwise and 
this allows urban employers to raise money wages by less than otherwise. This improvement in the 
urban sector’s terms of trade with agriculture means that real wages fall from the urban employers’ 
perspective while still rising in terms of purchasing power from the employees’ perspective.  
5 Connected with the possibility that demand is artificially repressed in this sector. 
6 Disguised unemployment is the well -known term for workers who share a limited amount of work 
and incomes but effectively produce nothing because the remaining workers could easily make up for 
their work if they leave. In this underlying sense their  marginal product is zero, while each worker’s 
shared “institutional” income tends to the average product of the family or social group. Most studies 
calculate the size of this surplus labour in a static sense by observing how many workers’ underlying 
marginal product is zero under current conditions. This understates its potential dynamic extent as 
and when workers are found alternative higher-paying jobs that increase the demand for agricultural 
products which thereby both motivates and provides the funding for labour-saving innovations. 5 
 
development there than has so far been achieved. The rest of this report is intended to show 
what  positive  and  negative  lessons  may  be  gained  from  an  examination  of  the  policies 
pursued  in  Colombia  and  Singapore  in  their  attempts  to  deal  with  similar  problems  of 
underemployment, poverty and inequality. 
 
3.  The Colombian experience 
 
For many years Colombia’s economic growth has  been greatly below its potential when 
considering the degree to which its abundant natural, physical and manpower resources had 
been chronically underutilised. Population growth had doubled in only 20 years – from 11 
million in 1953 to 22 million in 1973 – due to high rural birth rates coupled with a sharp 
decline in infant mortality with the spread of vaccination programmes. Thereafter, population 
growth began to decline, from 3.3% a year to 1.5% today, so the next doubling of population, 
to 44 million in 2005, took rather longer (32 years). 
 
Population growth was accompanied by significant shifts to the cities. The urban population 
was 33% of the total in 1950 and this had risen to 45% by 1960, a similar percentage to that 
of China today. However, this figure was inflated by a violent civil war in the 1950s because 
it was concentrated in rural areas which led to unusually strong outmigration. In the absence 
of adequate conventional housing in central locations, a large proportion of these migrants 
settled  on  the  peripheries  of  the  bigger  cities,  notably  around  the  capital,  Bogota,  in 
unlicensed  squatter  settlements  or  ‘barrios  de  invasión’,  erecting  flimsy  structures  and 
illegally tapping electricity from nearby overhead cables.
7 Many of these settlements would 
later be regularised by the authorities and provided with paved roads and vital services such 
as water and sewage. Being distant from the major employment centres,  workers had to 
suffer long commuting times on horribly overcrowded fume-filled buses. 
 
What was clearly needed was a much more  adequate supply of shelter for actual and 
potential immigrants into the cities. Its absence dilutes the ability of industry and commerce 
to prosper  by exploiting great potential  urban agglomeration economies. Agglomeration 
economies are also restrained if there is an inadequate supply of other structures such as 
factories, offices, schools and shops, plus related infrastructure such as the road and utilities 
network.  
 
All of these construction-sector projects have one thing in common: they are long -lasting 
investments. They also tend to be expensive because large in relation to current household 
incomes in the case of housing; relative to current business incomes in the case of factories, 
offices and shops; and relative to current state revenues in the case of public infrastructure.  
In the case of private sector  investments, this almost always necessitates outside funding 
over a long period of time during which the buildings are providing their current services. 
Young families near the beginning of their working lives can usually only buy a house or 
apartment costing two or three times their annual income  after supplementing  their own 
limited savings with a mortgage repayable over a long period. Similarly for new businesses. 
So these structures are usually only affordable or desir able purchases if the monthly debt 
servicing costs are at or below monthly rents for comparable properties.   
 
This  was  the  background  to  a  bold  but  controversial  new  national  p lan  launched  by 
President Misael Pastrana in 1972 as the famous Plan of the Four Strategies.
8 This plan was 
                                                 
7 The population of Bogota was approximately 1.7 million at the 1964 census and 2.9 million in 1973. 
By the time of the 2009 census, it was nearly 8.6 million with a further million in nearby municipalities. 
8 Its main author was Lauchlin Currie, a Canadian -born New Deal economist in the United States 
during the administration of President Franklin D Roosevelt. FDR appointed him as his personal 
White House adviser for economic affairs from 1939 -45. He was actin g head of the lend -lease 
administration to China in 1941-43 and twice visited the wartime capital of Chungking. He first visited 6 
 
mainly designed to accelerate development via measures that would greatly boost urban job 
opportunities.  The  first  priority  (and  the  first  of  the  four  strategies)
9  was to ensure that 
existing and future urban families could enjoy far superior housing conditions than currently 
prevailed for the majority. Hitherto, there had been three main types of housing and housing 
finance:  
(i)  Unlicensed  sprawling settlements with overcrowded, unsanitary   shelters built with 
very poor quality materials. Finance for these very low-cost shacks was generally out 
of the personal savings of the occupant families together with their own work.  They 
were usually on low-cost land whose value was low because of its relatively remote 
location  and/or  because  it  lacked  basic  services.  Sometimes  these  ‘barrios  de 
invasión’ were on more valuable central-city sites that were often being held vacant 
either for speculative reasons or  intended for planned conventional buildings of a 
higher  standard  that  were  scheduled  to  use  the  land  more  intensively  (because 
intended for higher-rise buildings of a kind that could not be built by unspecialised, 
unskilled amateurs).  
(ii)  Heavily  subsidised  popular  housing  for  the  very  poor  with  funds  provided  by  the 
state-owned Instituto de Credito Territorial (ICT). These housing units were superior 
to those typical of barrios de invasión but still generally of low quality, overcrowded, 
and, because of the ICT’s financial constraints, also on low-value land that was not 
necessarily the best location from a wider urban planning perspective. 
(iii)  Subsidised higher quality housing for the middle and higher income groups financed 
and built by the Banco Central Hipotecario (BCH) – or Central Mortgage Bank – that 
held a virtual monopoly on this section of the mortgage finance industry. 
 
Subsidies place a heavy direct or indirect strain on the national budget. In the case of both 
the ICT and BCH, finance was raised via tax-exempt bearer bonds that favoured higher-rate 
taxpayers, at the expense of government tax revenues. During the 1960s the average rate of 
inflation in Colombia was 11%, but fluctuated between 5% and 25%. Meanwhile, the nominal 
rate of interest on ICT and BCH bonds was fixed at 8.5% up to 1968 and 11.5% thereafter. 
Thus the real rate fluctuated widely,  was very low on average, and often negative. This 
resulted in a very low capture of funds except briefly between 1968 and 1971 when nominal 
rates were raised and the inflation rate fell.
10 The government responded to the deficiency of 
saving by requiring large forced purchases of ICT and BCH bonds by public institutions such 
as pension funds and other financial institutions.  
 
In addition to these  low-return forced savings, the government directly subsidised the ICT 
out of the central budget. These were necessitated by large losses made by the ICT on its 
operations that involved chronic de-capitalisation. This was because the ICT was unable to 
charge a high enough interest rate to its low-income borrowers to cover its costs. Even with 
low or even negative real interest rates the delinquency on  its  loans was very high.  (In 
                                                                                                                                                        
Colombia as head of a World Bank mission in 1949 and stayed on to advise successive Colombian 
governments  on  economic  policy  until  his  death  in  1993  (Sandilands  1990).  He  wrote  the  main 
background paper, Taming the Megalopolis (Currie 1976), for the 1976 UN Habitat conference in 
Vancouver at which Habitat was first established. 
9 In brief, the four interrelated strategies were (i)  plans to boost urban housing via a new housing 
finance system together with a new form of urban design; (ii) measures to boost non -traditional 
exports by ensuring that the exchange rate would no longer be chronically over -valued; (iii) increased 
agricultural productivity, to be accomplished partly through greater investment expected to follow from 
higher demand resulting from faster growth of national income together with the consolidation of rural 
farms as and when poorer farm families emigrated to better -paying non-agricultural work; and (iv) 
improved income distribution related to the first three strategies but intended to be complemented by 
more progressive taxation, notably by the capture of rising urban land values via a “valorisation tax”.  
10 An important lesson was evidence of a very high interest elasticity of supply of savings. This made 
possible a temporary boost to building in the late 1960s and, as we shall see, also after the 1972 
reforms. 7 
 
October 1969, for example, the International Labour Office (1970) reported that 53.3% of the 
ICT loan portfolio were in arrears.) 
 
This compared with a negligible delinquency rate at the BCH which, with its monopoly and a 
focus on high-income customers, was usually able to cover its costs. However, for this it 
needed to charge 16% on its mortgages, and it restricted the typical mortgage term to 10 
years because of the risks associated with a high and very variable rate of inflation.
11 These 
conditions significantly repressed  demand for its mortgages, but this was in line with the 
relatively  sluggish  growth  of  its  available  funds,  and  the  BCH  resiste d  change  in  its 
monopoly status that insulated it from competitive pressures to grow. 
 
The combined result of this housing system and related pattern of urbanisation was that the 
growth of both commercial and social housing was every year falling far short of the growth 
of new family formations in the towns and cities , hence continuously adding to an already 
substantial housing deficit.
12 As for social housing (known in Colombia as ‘vivienda popular’ 
or ‘vivienda de interes social’) the self-built and ICT homes were either slums from the start 
or, in the case of the ICT, were often to be the slums of the future because of their poor 
quality, small size, poor location, inadequate amenities, and social segregation. Poor quality 




The only way to reduce the country’s growing housing deficit was to introduce changes that 
would ensure an adequate  volume of long-term loans on affordable terms such that the 
growth of decent (non-slum) urban dwellings each year would exceed the growth of new 
family formations in the rapidly growing cities. On the one hand the supply of savings being 
channelled  into  housing  finance  needed  to  a  big  boost.  On  the  other  hand  demand  for 
mortgage finance had to match a greatly increased potential supply. As the problem was 
stated by two of the architects of the new institutional arrangements put in place in 1972, 
Lauchlin Currie and Luis Eduardo Rosas (1986): 
As rates of inflation rose it became less and less possible, without a heavy subsidy, to 
provide an adequate volume of long-term loans at low interest rates. As there were 
many competing demands for public expenditure, public low-cost housing was starved 
and the economy as a whole was deprived of the large but latent outlet for savings and 
the impulse for the generation of activity and employment that building in general could 
provide. 
 
To convert housing into a leading sector that could propel the entire economy on to a higher, 
sustainable growth path required simultaneous action on both the supply and demand side 
of  its financing. On the  supply  side,  mortgage  institutions  needed  to give  savers  safety, 
liquidity and a reasonable real return that was attractive relative to alternative destinations 
for  their  savings.  On  the  demand  side,  the  institutions  needed  to  attract  many  more 
borrowers  by  offering  mortgages  on  much  more  affordable  terms  than  before.  The 
conundrum was resolved by focusing on the problem of inflation.  
 
                                                 
11 This meant that nominal rates elsewhere in the market fluctuated more widely that the BCH rates, 
creating an unstable feast-and-famine pattern to its inflow of funds. 
12 According to the ICT, the urban housing deficit (defined as the difference between the number of 
urban family units and the size of the urban housing stock, with consequent unhealthy overcrowding) 
grew from 112,000 in 1951 to 254,000 in 1961 and 586,000 in 1971 (Sandilands, 1980:60). 
13 This has been a chronic problem with low-income public housing even in high-income countries 
such as Britain and the United States. In Britain, mainly under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 
the 1980s, council house tenants were given the opportunity to buy their homes. Maintenance costs 
were thus removed from the public purse. 8 
 
The ideal would be to eliminate inflation. Then, savers could be offered an attractive interest 
rate of, say, 4% in both real and nominal terms, with borrowers then charged, say, 6%. At 
this rate of interest, many more borrowers could afford a house compared to a situation in 
which inflation is 15% and the nominal interest rate 21% (to give a real rate of 6%), or even if 
nominal  rate  were  raised  only  to  15%  with  a  real  rate  of  zero.  For  at  21%  the  interest 
payments required in the first year of a mortgage (along with amortizations) would more than 
triple; and even at 15% they would more than double. Admittedly borrowers’ real outstanding 
debt would decline more rapidly in the inflationary situation, but the initial real cash flow or 
“front-end  loading”  of  repayments  would  be  unsupportable  for  many  potential  borrowers 
whose real incomes would otherwise be adequate.  
 
Unfortunately, Colombia has a poor record on inflation, though its record is not as bad as in 
other Latin American countries such as Brazil, Peru, Argentina and Chile where the value of 
money has occasionally been destroyed by hyper-inflation of 10,000% a year or more.
14 
Much of the blame lies with lax monetary control. The problem is not merely that inflation has 
been high on average, but that high inflation is almost always coupled with a greater degree 
of volatility. This plays additional havoc with the schedule of real repayments for borrowers if 
lenders insist on variable rate mortgages. And if mortgage rates are fixed, long-term lenders 
have difficulty attracting funds in the face of generally more flexible rates in the short-term 
markets. 
 
3:1   Colombia’s index-linked mortgage finance system 
 
Faced with this difficulty, two other Latin American countries, Brazil and Chile, had earlier 
introduced index-linking, or monetary correction schemes, to protect their housing finance 
from the distorting effects of inflation. In 1972 Colombia went further than Brazil or Chile in 
protecting her system to make housing (and related infrastructural investment) a motor of 
accelerated development while simultaneously protecting the real competitiveness of exports 
as the second motor (via regular index-linked adjustments of the exchange rate). What is 
particularly interesting from the point of view of lessons for China is that in both Colombia 
and (as we shall see) Singapore, urban housing and related infrastructure have been viewed 
as  complementary  priorities  that  support  one  another. Without  adequate  housing for  the 
work force, the cost of employing workers in export industries (and in import substitutes too) 
is increased as their supply and their health is reduced. Likewise, the supply of and demand 
for housing is greater with a more dynamic tradable goods sector. But in both cases the 
important  thing  is  the  possibility  of  a  greatly  increased  mobilisation  of  currently  grossly 
underutilised resources of labour and capital via the hitherto inadequately explored potential 
for increasing the real demand for both of these sectors without recourse to an excessive 
use of the central bank’s printing press. 
 
3.1.2  The  distinction  between  real  and  monetary  demand  and  its  significance  for 
housing finance 
 
The distinction between real and monetary sources of demand is sufficiently important for an 
understanding of the potential for a non-inflationary expansion of the supply of housing as to 
merit a digression at this point. What counts is not demand that is merely backed by an 
increase in the money supply. Rather, the key is an increase in real market demand backed 
by  real  incomes  and  the  associated  increase  in  real  supply  of  goods  and  services  in 
exchange – together constituting the real market size which was Adam Smith’s key to the 
                                                 
14 The consequential rise in nominal interest rates together with severely negative real rates causes 
both supply and demand for long-term finance to collapse. The construction sector bears the brunt of 
this – for example in Chile in the early 1970s (Sandilands 1980). The housing market is not immune to 
this problem even in developed countries in times of moderate inflation: for example, in the case of 
the US Savings and Loan (S&L) debacle of the 1980s. 9 
 
wealth  of  nations.  Smith’s  insights  were  extended  by  Allyn  Young  (1928)  in  his  seminal 
presidential  address  to  the  British  Association  on  “increasing  returns  and  economic 
progress,” and by Lauchlin Currie (a Harvard student of Young’s) in a later series of papers 
that linked Young’s insights on the possibilities of self-sustaining rather than self-exhausting 
growth with his equally deep understanding of monetary theory and policy (Currie, 1974, 
1997; and Currie in Sandilands, ed., 2004).  
 
Unfortunately there is much confusion, even among economists, on the monetary causes of 
inflation, partly because of semantics when terms such as “bank deposits”, “money” and 
“credit” are not carefully defined or differentiated. The money supply comprises notes and 
coin in circulation plus bank deposits. However, there are two distinct types of deposit: (i) 
highly active balances in demand or current accounts held by businesses and individuals to 
provide for the difference between current incomes and outgoings, and on which interest is 
not paid or is paid at a significantly lower rate than on (ii) the much less active saving or time 
deposits whose motivation arises from a different source – the desire for interest income.  
 
Since demand deposits are almost universally considered as a component of money or the 
means of payment, it is perhaps understandable why many people include all bank deposits 
(including saving deposits) in the definition of money,  and even go on to include saving 
deposits in non-bank financial institutions such as savings and loan associations and other 
mortgage “banks”. However, consider the following scenarios in two consecutive years: 
(i)  A 10% increase in the actual means of payment – in the sense of notes and coin in 
circulation plus current accounts (the conventional M1 definition) – used in settlement 
of debts between buyers and sellers, when real GDP is growing at, say, 7%. Then 
inflation would run at around 3% if the demand for money as a percentage of GDP 
(the inverse of the velocity of circulation) is fairly constant. At the same time, assume 
a  10%  increase  in  time  or  saving  deposits  in  banks  and  non-bank  financial 
intermediaries. The inclusion of saving deposits would give rise to a broad “M2” (if 
only bank deposits are included) or a broader “M3” definition of money (inclusive of 
deposits in non-bank financial intermediaries) which we assume grows at the same 
10% rate as the M1 sub-set.  
(ii)  A 10% increase in M1 but an increase in the growth of time deposits from 10% to 
20% so that in this year M2 and M3 now grow at, say, 15%.  
 
If we focus on M1 there should be little or no difference in the rate of inflation (for a given 
growth of GDP and velocity of circulation). But if we focus instead on the 15% growth of M2 
or M3 we may be led to the anomalous and absurd conclusion that a growth in savings is 
inflationary.
15 For example, how could we then explain, without careful examination of the 
composition of the deposits, the very different impact on inflation if, in year 2, the growth of 
M2 is still 15% but is now the weighted average of 20% increase in M1 (brought about by an 
increase in central bank reserves) while the growth of saving deposits is unchanged at 10%?  
 
I have belaboured this point because when in Colombia the new index -linked housing 
finance system, launched in 1972 (and  explained below), led to a substantial increase in 
saving deposits, its critics – who included bankers exposed to new competition and central 
bankers anxious to shift the blame for their own failure to control the money supply
16  – 
                                                 
15 Note too that if we focus on the growth of “credit” (or the total of loans) in the economy we would 
have to include loans based on all deposits in the system. But this aggregate can and does differ 
widely from the growth of the means of payment (M1), depending on the rate of saving. Thus at one 
moment a given growth of credit can be inflationary and at another time deflationary.  
16 The central bank was not given independence until 1991. It was also often dominated by spending 
ministers who treated it as a development bank (fostering development with inflationary finance) as 
well as a central bank whose main objective should be monetary control.  These conflicting objectives 10 
 
pointed to the accelerated increase in overall deposits (“M3”) and blamed the new system – 
and the increase in building that it financed – for the increase in inflation.
17 Actually, the initial 
natural  lag  between  a  very  big  increase  in  deposits  in  the  new  system  and  their 
disbursement meant that a portion of the deposits were temporarily congealed in a special 
account in the central bank. This helped to restrain the excessive expansion of the money 
supply over this period. 
 
When investment is financed by real savings out of real income backed by production, that 
production  is  available  for  transfer  to  borrowers  to  spend  in  exchange  for  other  things 
(housing in the case of mortgage finance intermediated by the relevant institutions) instead 
of what the lenders would have spent it on. There is a change in the composition but not the 
total of real expenditures. In the case of increased savings used to finance new housing, this 
finances the wages and related consumption of construction workers as well as the local 
building  materials. These have a relatively  low  import content, thus generating high real 
domestic multiplier effects. Building employs many unskilled workers (who nevertheless can 
quickly learn skills on the job) who were previously grossly underemployed. The net effect is 
a potentially self-sustaining and non-inflationary boost to the real rate of economic growth, 
along the lines described above. 
 
All depends, however, on an increase in real effective demand for housing that matches the 
potential growth of real saving instead of being reliant on inflationary finance. In fact we have 
explained how inflationary finance (finance not supported by an increase in real savings) had 
the effect of repressing demand for long-term mortgage finance because of the distortions 
caused by high and variable interest rates in the face of inflation. The purpose of the 1972 
reforms was to resolve this problem.  
 
3.1.3  The main features of Colombia’s index-linked housing finance system 
 
The key institutional reform was to create a number of competitive, private Savings and 
Housing  Corporations  (Corporaciones  de  Ahorro  y  Vivienda  –  CAVs)  whose  assets 
(exclusively construction and mortgage loans) and liabilities (liquid saving deposits) were 
authorised  to  be  expressed  in  an  inflation-adjusted  unit  known  as  “units  of  constant 
purchasing power” (Spanish acronym: UPAC), with daily adjustments to the index in line with 
a  moving  average  of  the  previous  year’s  consumer  price  index.  This  had  two  important 
consequences.  
 
Firstly, by offering savers for the first time a guaranteed real return (initially set at around 5% 
net) the  CAVs  experienced  a  dramatic  inflow  of funds  that greatly  increased  the  overall 
saving rate (and was not simply a diversion of funds from other institutions) and of course 
the proportion going to the finance first of new building and then to their final owners.  
 
Secondly, on the demand side, even though the initial real rate of interest was set at around 
8%, this was only about half of what borrowers had to pay in interest in the early years of a 
                                                                                                                                                        
can help explain why Leonardo Villar (2009) finds that monetary policy in Colombia has often failed to 
be contra-cyclical. 
17 See, for example, Miguel Urrutia and Olga Marcel Namen (2011). Urrutia had been on the board of 
the  central  bank  in  1972 -74  and  headed  the  National  Planning  Department  with  a  change  of 
government that was less enthusiastic about housing as a dynamic leading sector. The modifications 
he  and  subsequent  planners  made  are  described  with  relatively  little  complaint  in  Urrutia  and 
Namen’s 2011 paper (though they did acknowledge the political influence of middle-class borrowers) 
despite  their  debilitating  effects.  In  similar  vein,  a  later  Planning  Department  head,  Juan  Carlos 
Echeverry  (2002)  is  representative  of  those  who  regard  housing  as  a  relatively  “unproductive” 
investment without seeing the irony in their view of investment as “productive” when, for example, it is 
for the manufacture of bricks, cement, windows and high-speed lifts that would not be produced in the 
absence of final demand. I attach my review of this book as an Appendix. 11 
 
traditional mortgage contract at that time. Furthermore, the attractive rates made it less risky 
for the CAVs to extend the typical mortgage period to 15 years. The result was that demand 
initially ran well ahead of the increased supply of saving.
18 This explains why initially demand 
had to be restrained by a high (but still affordable) real interest rate and relatively high down 
payments,  and why the mortgage term was not extended further to 20 -30 years as is 
common in other countries.  
 
The success of the system in boosting housing finance and the rate of house-building to well 
over 20% a year, confirmed the hypothesis that savers and borrowers would respond 
positively  to  incentives,  and  that  private  builders  would  likewise  respond  positively  to  
increased profits from increased real demand for the finished product. Urban unemployment 
fell, and GDP growth doubled to 7%.  
 
This was partly due to the contemporaneous increase in non -traditional exports which also 
showed a positive response to the incentive of a new “crawling-peg” exchange rate adjusted 
regularly in line with inflation to avoid overvaluation. The record also showed, however, that 
there  was  no  necessary  conflict  between  growth  of  urban  house-building  and  growth  of 
urban industry. Indeed the record suggested that they are complementary so long as the two 
sectors are assured of an increase in real demand (foreign demand in the case of exports) to 
which increased supply can respond without the fear of bankruptcy from a fall in price faster 
than the fall in costs that can usually accompany an increase in physical scale. 
 
Unfortunately, again as mentioned above, the system’s dynamism was diluted over time by a 
variety of modifications (called “reforms”) that could be explained in two main ways. First 
there were the politically inspired complaints by the vested interests of borrowers – usually 
the relatively rich – who suffered from money illusion when their outstanding mortgage debts 
were adjusted in line with inflation. This was normally at a rate below the rise in nominal 
incomes that accompanied the rise in real per capita GDP, but they complained that they 
were being exploited by savers, many of whom were small savers much poorer than the 
borrowers. Secondly there were those who blamed the system for being inflationary when in 
fact the opposite was the case. The system adjusted only to past, recorded rates of inflation, 
not to future expectations. 
 
These changes consequently took two main forms. First the index base for adjusting the 
system’s assets and liabilities was changed so that it progressively fell below the actual rate 
of inflation, to the jeopardy of savers and the benefit of borrowers. Secondly, the CAVs’ 
savings deposits were treated as inflationary money balances and subjected to increased 
reserve requirements by the central bank. The result was a decline in saving.  
 
A further modification was that the private CAVs were increasingly subject to regulations as 
to the proportion of their assets that had to be for smaller mortgages on lower-cost housing 
for poorer, higher-risk borrowers. Just as the 1977 US Community Reinvestment Act obliged 
banks to increase the share of loans going to sub-prime properties and thereby increased 
their risks and contributed to the global crisis of 2008-11, so similar regulations imposed on 
the CAVs reduced their profitability and dynamism and even contributed to the bankruptcy of 
some of the corporations in the aftermath of a major recession in 1998-2002. The remaining 
                                                 
18 As mentioned above, disbursements followed savings with a lag. Meanwhile the excess was held 
on deposit in the central bank with the result that the increased saving had a restraining effect on the 
unfortunate contemporary inflationary expansion of the money supply (that Urrutia and Nemen [2011] 
do not mention). A vital lesson for China is that investment should be financed only by real saving, 
except to the extent that the money supply can be expanded in a non-inflationary way if its expansion 
is in line with the growth of real GDP and the associated growth of real demand for money to hold for 
current transaction purposes. It is thus possible both to boost real spending while pursuing a policy of 
severe monetary restraint. 12 
 
CAVs were allowed to diversify their loan portfolio away from mortgages. They could also 
offer fixed-rate mortgages on non-indexed terms, and as inflation fell consistently to single 
digit figures for the first time in decades most new loans were on these terms. However, the 
banks insisted that for low-income borrowers their smaller mortgages would continue to be 




3.2  A continuing and growing housing deficit. So, for whom should housing be built? 
 
The result of this mixed history since the early 1970s is that although the absolute number of 
good-quality middle-class housing (mainly in multifamily medium- and high-rise apartments 
on high-price land in favourable city locations) has greatly increased, and has transformed 
the appearance of Colombia’s cities, this type of housing has not kept pace with the even 
more rapid growth of new family units in the burgeoning cities. The result is growth in the 
absolute  number  and  percentage  of  families  living  in  inadequate,  overcrowded 
accommodation  on  poorly  serviced,  low-priced  land  –  or  on  higher-priced  land  but  even 
more densely packed in, as the only way to keep down the per capita rents.
19 
 
In face of this growing deficit, the government has been pressured into an increased reliance 
on direct approaches to the solution of the housing crisis. That is to say, on direct subsidies 
on the rents and mortgages of poor families, largely administered by the state-run Instituto 
de Credito Territorial (ICT), whose name was changed in 1991 to the Instituto Nacional de 
Vivienda  de  Interes  Social  y  Reforma  Urbana,  INURBE   when  it  was  given  wider 
responsibilities  to  “adjudicate  subsidies  to  low-income  families  “for  the  improvement, 
construction or acquisition of vivienda de interes social [social housing]”.  
 
Subsidies of course place a strain on an already strained national budget, and put pressure 
on the central bank to monetise fiscal deficits. In this way demand for a large part of the 
housing  stock  is  not  expanded  via  real  effective  demand  from  savings  backed  by  real 
income and output, but rather through an inflationary monetary demand. By helping to stoke 
inflation,  this  contributes  to  the  discrimination  against  long-term  mortgage  finance  on 
affordable  terms  (absent  a  determinedly  protected  index-linked  system),  for  reasons 
explained above. Paradoxically, if subsidies do increase inflation, it is moot whether they 
would actually yield a net increase in the housing stock. If, on the other hand, they are paid 
for  out  of  general  taxation,  this  potentially  involves  disincentives  to  work  and  enterprise 
and/or the displacement of other public expenditures that may adversely affect economic 
growth, hence lower real demand for improved housing for all. 
 
After allowing for the effect of subsidies on rents and mortgages or on disposable incomes, 
the direct approach to the reduction of the housing deficit asks how housing can be matched 
to what people can afford, and building accordingly. But, almost by definition, most people in 
developing countries, including Colombia (average PPP income $8,500 per head in 2008) 
and China ($6,020), have incomes that are far too low to cover the building costs of anything 
except extremely basic shelter. The proportion of the population living on less than US$2 a 
day ($730 a year, or perhaps double that in PPP terms) was recently estimated at 26% for 
Colombia and 36% for China (Population Reference Bureau 2010). The PPP family income 
of these groups would be perhaps $6,000 for a 4-person family in Colombia and $4,500 for a 
                                                 
19 According to the Population Reference Bureau (2010), the urban population in Colombia had risen 
to 75% by 2005 and the percentage living in slums was estimated at 18% (more than six million 
people). Most of the 25% living in rural areas (11 million people) also lived in poorly serviced sub-
standard housing. For China the figures were 195 million people living in urban slums (38% of the 
urban population which in turn was 45% of the total population). As with Colombia, a large percentage 
of the Chinese rural poor have very sub-standard housing. 13 
 
3-person family in China. If we assume that 33% is the maximum proportion of family income 
that can reasonably be devoted to house rents or debt servicing, this gives for these groups 
an annual budget of a mere $2,000 for Colombia and $1,500 for China. If these figures are 
capitalised at 5%, this would allow an expenditure of $40,000 and $30,000 for new housing 
units for these 4 or 3 person families in Colombia and China respectively.  
 
With such low budgets available to so many low-income families, massive subsidies would 
be required to deal with the housing deficit if it were tackled by building anything other than 
new slums for these people. In reality, in Colombia as in all developing countries there is a 
constraint on the size of the national budget that can be allocated for housing subsidies. As 
with education and health, there is clearly a case for subsidising the housing needs of the 
very  poor.  However,  unlike  in  the  case  of  education  and  health  services  that  must  be 
produced directly and continuously to serve the need, with housing there is a potentially 
more effective indirect way to meet the needs of the poor. That is because housing, if well 
built, is a very durable good.  
 
Consider an analogy with the automobile industry. Manufacturers do not build cars for the 
poor; they build them for the people who can afford the price that covers their high costs of 
production. These new cars are added to the total stock of new and second-hand cars, and 
purchasers of new cars will sell their old ones on the second-hand market to less wealthy 
individuals (who in turn sell their old cars) at lower prices depending on age and condition. In 
this way it is possible to buy perfectly serviceable cars that are, say, 10 years old, for as little 
as $2,000  (or  even less) toward the bottom of this filtering-down (or  upward escalation) 
process. At these prices even some very poor people can manage to afford quite good cars. 
However, it would be impossible to build a new car for anything like $2,000.  
 
Likewise,  in  the  housing  market  there  is  a  huge  stock  of  housing  of  different  ages  and 
conditions. One difference is that conventionally built housing is even more durable than 
cars and, with regular maintenance, can last many decades. The greater the effort put into 
ensuring  that  new  quality  homes  are  built  for  those  who  can  afford  them  (and  into 
maximising the number who are able to afford them with appropriate mortgage repayment 
schedules), the more dynamic and non-inflationary can be the annual rate of growth of the 
construction sector. There would then be less need for  subsidies;  or a  given budget for 
subsidies would be able to stretch further. Clearly, subsidy programmes (such as the ICT 
programmes in Colombia) cannot on their own be expected to be nearly as dynamic as a 
programme that includes middle-income housing that is self-financing because fully geared 
to effective demand.  
 
The other key point is that if newly built houses are then also of a quality that is at least as 
good as the average of the existing stock, and at least match the number of new family units 
being formed at the same time, then there would be an upgrading of the quality of the stock 
and/or  rooms  available  for  the  poorest  families,  and  their  price  would  be  lowered. 
Furthermore, this price would be below the cost of building equivalent new accommodation 
and space for those at the bottom of the ladder. These people include families recently 
arrived from rural areas, most of whom are near the very bottom of the urban income scale. 
They in turn would have released their rural homes (or space in those homes) for those 
remaining behind. The escalation or filtration process can have deep benign ramifications. 
 
This benign result depends crucially, however, on the volume of  reasonable quality new 
building matching population growth in its most economic locations, and unfortunately this 
has not been happening. For example, between 1996 and 2008 the average annual number 
of  new  houses  financed  by  the  formal  financial  system  was  only  42,453,  whereas  the 14 
 
average growth of the urban population over this period exceed 500,000 person, or around 
100,000 households if the average household had five persons.
20   
 
3.3.  Urbanisation and land values 
 
This brings us to consider further not only the efficiency gains from more rapid urbanisation, 
but  also  to  the question  of  a  more  equitable  distribution  of  those  gains.  On the  side  of 
efficiency, we have already stressed the importance of greater mobility of labour and capital 
to where their real returns are greatest. So long as disguisedly unemployed rural labour can 
find more productive work in the cities, the country’s GDP is increased and resources more 
fully employed.  
 
If the growth rate of the formal construction sector can be boosted by more fully exploiting 
the  potential  to  convert  latent  demand for  middle-income  housing  into  dynamic  effective 
demand along lines reviewed above, then this would create many more formal sector jobs 
with  higher  incomes  than  migrants  can  obtain  on  what  might  be  called  a  do-it-yourself, 
Robinson Crusoe-style of unlicensed, informal construction work. Higher wages in the formal 
sector  could  then finance  better  housing  than  that  constructed  in  barrios  de  invasion.  It 
would also increase reciprocal demand for other goods and services (including, but not only, 
the industrial and service sector inputs that are purchased by and then assembled by the 
construction  sector  itself),  and  be  a  potentially  powerful  motor  of  overall  growth.  The 
increased scale of the market would generally enhance gains from specialisation and urban 
agglomeration economies. All of this also has a symbiotic relationship with the growth of 
exports  up  a  dynamic  “ladder  of  comparative  advantage”  as  resource  endowments  and 
relative factor prices alter. 
 
So from the point of view of increased employment and higher wages, urbanisation improves 
the  distribution  of  incomes  because  it  helps  to  make  labour  relatively  more  scarce.  In 
Colombia where the rural-urban migration that absorbs the pool of surplus rural labour has 
already  proceeded  much  further  than  in  China,  upward  pressure  on  wages  has  been 
stronger than in China, but this may now be changing as China (with its relatively slower 
overall population growth) powers ahead economically at a faster pace than in Colombia. At 
the same time, this very process of demographic shift to the cities comes up against a fixed 
supply of land. The pressure of demand for land from increased population, incomes and 
economic activity, all of which requires space in which to live and do business, inexorably 
drives up the price.  
 
Normally, a rise in price above the cost of production elicits an increased supply that tends to 
reverse the price and bring it back in line with costs. The land market, however, is different. 
First, the overall supply cannot be increased when demand increases. The supply can only 
be transferred from one person or one use to another. Second, land qua land does not have 
any  resource  (labour  and  capital)  costs  of  production.  It  is  “the  free  gift  of  Nature”  (the 
classical  economist  David  Ricardo’s  famous  phrase).  Thus,  when  demand  increases  its 
(resource) cost of production does not increase. However, it does have opportunity costs, so 
that one use of the same piece of land displaces other uses, and this is one reason why land 
commands a price. The other reason is that some plots are more desirable than others 
because of intrinsic differences in fertility (important in the case of agricultural land or mines) 
or surrounding amenities (infrastructure of all kinds). This influences the strength of demand 
for one site relative to another. Then, for the buyer or renter of land the price is a cost. For 
society the price is only a transfer payment.  
 
                                                 
20 Sources: Departamento Nacional de Estadistica (DANE), for data on new houses financed:  
(http://www.dane.gov.co/daneweb_V09/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=87&Itemid=57);  
and Population Reference Bureau (2010) for data on urban population growth. 15 
 
Society, however, rather than the individual owner of a particular site, has built and paid for 
the infrastructure that makes the land of a city valuable (over and above its natural features 
and location relative to climate, natural waterways etc.). The individual owner pays for the 
buildings and improvements on the particular site, but these have only a trivial effect by 
themselves on the value of the land on which they sit. 
 
This brief excursion into classical land economics is intended merely to highlight one of the 
most powerful forces acting against what would otherwise tend to be the equalising forces of 
competition and mobility – to the extent that these are allowed free play – during the process 
of development. Whereas competition and mobility promote an equalisation of wages and 
returns on saving and investment in man-made capital (buildings and equipment), no such 
forces operate in the market for land. Land is both fixed and immobile. Competition for its 
services  does  not  drive  its  price  down  to  its  (zero)  direct  and  indirect  labour  costs  of 
production. Pure scarcity relative to demand determines its price.  
 
The socially efficient use of land requires that it goes to those who can obtain the highest 
social value from the labour and capital applied to it. Price then performs a socially useful 
rationing function. But insofar as the overall value of land is a reflection of Nature’s bounty or 
the  collectively  provided  civic  amenities  and  infrastructure  and  purchasing  power  of  the 
community, its value is a community value. As such there is a powerful ethical as well as 
economic  case  for  ensuring  that  increases  in  land  values  consequent  on  the  growth  of 
national economic activity and population growth be captured by the community as state 
revenue  instead  of  relying  so  much  on  the  taxation  of  work  and  productive  enterprise. 
Nowhere  is  this  more  germane  than  in  rapidly  urbanising  developing  countries  such  as 
Colombia and China. It is also highly germane to Singapore (reviewed below) where, even 
though it has been defined as an almost completely urbanised country for the best part of a 
century, rapid economic growth continues to put strong upward pressure on land values. 
 
In Colombia “valorization taxes” have been imposed, on a piecemeal basis, to capture the 
increase in value of lands surrounding major public works such as road widening schemes 
where clear localised enhancements could be identified and where political obstacles could 
be overcome. However, even in the case of the recent major investment in “TransMilenio” – 
a rapid bus transit system for Bogota that greatly reduced travel times along its routes – it 
has been hard to disentangle the increases in land values associated with this one project 
from the multiple contemporaneous influences of new and old economic activity (Rodriguez 
and Mojica, 2008). Thus most of the windfall land value increments have remained in private 
hands, except insofar as the city authorities already owned some of the land needed for 
such  projects  or  could  acquire  it  at  pre-development  values  before  auctioning  it  to 
prospective  private  developers  after  granting  planning  permission  for  developments 
stimulated  by  the  new  publicly  provided  infrastructure.  (This  was  common  practice  in 
Singapore using powers under its Land Acquisition Acts; see below). 
 
It is well-known that this process of granting official permissions to convert land from one use 
to new, much higher economic uses that were previously prohibited or uneconomic is open 
to much abuse. In Colombia, as in China today, permission to convert agricultural land to 
urban uses can release huge repressed land value and yield major windfall gains to owners 
if left untaxed. Stories abound of cases of corruption that these windfall gains can induce. In 
China,  peasants’  smallholdings  can  be  subject  to  compulsory  purchase  orders  at  their 
assessed value as agricultural land. This prevents the owners from obtaining windfall gains, 
and a case can be made for this if the windfalls are instead used to finance projects that 
benefit the wider community more equally. However, this is not achieved if local officials then 
sell the land to private developers at a price below its much higher value in urban use, after 
pocketing bribes. The community is the loser. As Henderson (2009: 22-23), for example, 
suggests,  the  more  transparent  auctioning  of  leases  would  help  to  reduce  corruption. 
However, these dramatic examples of more-or-less overnight windfall gains should not hide 16 
 
the  less  dramatic  but  far  more  widespread  steady  rise  in  the  value  of  land  throughout 
existing  urban  space  in  the  face  of  ever-increasing  demand.  Regular  revaluations  of 
properties for local property tax purposes (preferably with a distinction drawn between value 
of buildings and value of land, with higher rates imposed on the latter than the former) would 
go  a  long  way  to  redistributing  community-created  values  from  the fortunate few  private 
beneficiaries to the community as a whole. 
 
Rising land values are both the consequence of urban growth (varying with the way in which 
infrastructure and amenities are concentrated) and are the way that land is rationed to the 
highest  bidders.  Naturally  the  rich  can  afford  to  live  in  the  most  desirable,  exclusive 
neighbourhoods. The poor are forced to cheaper, remoter and less well-serviced lands, or 
live on more expensive land but in densely populated overcrowded conditions. In both cases 
the  tendency  is  toward  an  undesirable  degree  of  social  segregation  that  is  another 
justification for government intervention in the play of the land market. In Colombia we have 
seen that subsidisation of the rents and mortgages of the poor has played an important, 
albeit a subsidiary role in the provision of social housing, enabling the poor to live in better 
conditions and richer neighbourhoods than would otherwise have been possible. Ideally, the 
sources of funds for this social goal would be derived in much greater degree from the public 
capture of land value increments (“participación de plusvalía” is the term for an instrument 
recently introduced in Colombia for the capture of up to 50% of land values created by public 
actions: see Patricia Acosta, 2008) than from the taxation of productive enterprise. 
 
3.4.  Urban design 
 
The  typical  pattern  of  urban  growth  in  Colombia  has  largely  driven  and  been  driven  by 
market-determined land values. City design and its pattern of expansion has also of course 
been influenced by the interventions of national and city planners in zoning and deciding on 
the location of infrastructure and public housing. The latter projects, however, have tended to 
follow and reinforce rather than consciously modify market-driven land values. But some 
interesting attempts to buck the market trends have been made. Lauchlin Currie, as adviser 
to  the  Bogota  and  national  planning  departments  over  many  years  has  again  played  a 
prominent role here. In a 1967 study for the then mayor  of Bogota,  Virgilio Barco (later 
President of Colombia), he proposed a multi-centred alternative to further development of a 
mono-centred city with dispersion following the existing lines to the north and west. These 
ideas  were  incorporated  into  the  1972  national  plan  by  President  Misael  Pastrana  as  a 
“cities-within-cities”  or multiple-centre approach to the future growth of Bogota and other 
major cities, and, as mentioned above,  Currie’s subsequent book (Currie 1976) was the 
centrepiece of the 1976 United Nations Habitat conference in Vancouver.  
 
The idea, strongly influenced by Singapore, Paris and Moscow was to try to minimise the 
dominance of the private car and to minimise transport requirements by creating within each 
metropolitan area, separate distinct centres which would be as self-contained as possible, 
with an appropriate mix of residences, workplaces and social amenities serving mainly the 
residents of each centre, and making each centre as walkable, hence as densely occupied 
as possible, yet with ample open spaces partly by minimising road space and the need for 
private cars (see Sandilands 1990, chapter 11 for details). The new city of El Salitre near to 
but distinct from the traditional centre of Bogota was an example of the partial influence of 
these ideas. It was an identifiably distinct centre with a concentration of government offices 
and cross-subsidisation of residents that attempted to maximise the number of government 
workers who also lived in this new city-within-the city. By locating new cities within the wider 
metropolitan  area  the  benefits  of  agglomeration  economies  were  not  lost.  This  was  in 
contrast to policies that sought to establish small new cities beyond the ambit of an existing 
metropolis. The idea was to tame the metropolitan design so as to make it more efficient and 
more liveable, rather than to curb its growth and sacrifice its natural advantages.  
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4.  Comparisons with Singapore 
 
A partial precedent for the model of metropolitan development that Currie had in mind was to 
be  found  in  Singapore  where  he  made  two  fact-finding  visits,  in  1973  and  1984, 
accompanied by senior Colombian planning officials. During the decade preceding his 1973 
visit, Singapore had rehoused one-third of its entire population in a series of large, relatively 
compact new towns. By the time of his second visit in 1984 (on a trip that followed an official 
visit  to  Beijing,  Hong  Kong  and  the  booming  new  city  of  Shenzhen),  three-quarters  of 
Singapore’s  population  had  been  rehoused  and  her  new  towns  were  increasingly  self-
contained cities-within-the city. 
 
Singapore’s new housing developments were almost exclusively high-rise apartment blocks 
of ten to twenty stories (with much higher blocks accommodating, amongst others, many of 
the  rich  expatriate  community  working  in  the  much  sought-after  downtown  financial  and 
commercial  districts  where  extremely  high  land  values  rationally  dictated  even  higher 
densities  for  both  residential  and  commercial  activities).  An  unusually  high  proportion  of 
national income was diverted to building, yet the country had one of the fastest growth rates 
in  the  world.  The  proportional  share  of  building  grew  progressively  over  the  years  –  a 
reflection of the fact that it was a leading sector with a growth rate significantly higher than 
the rest of the economy, thus levering up the overall rate of economic growth, alongside a 
vibrant export-oriented manufacturing sector that was its complementary motor of growth. 
The coexistence of exceptionally rapid growth of housing and exports belied the fears of 
those who thought that only industrial sector investment could be a productive leading sector 
while believing that investment in housing would represent an unproductive drag on growth. 
 
Singapore  has  not  had  to face  the  challenge of  massive  potential  migration  to  its  cities 
resulting from the displacement of labour by new agricultural technology coupled with low 
elasticity of demand, as most developing countries such as Colombia and China have faced. 
Singapore has been a city state for most of its modern history. However, as Southeast Asia’s 
leading entrepôt city, a very large number of its citizens were until fairly recently engaged in 
very low-productivity, low paid, labour-intensive work loading and unloading ships in the very 
overcrowded harbour district, in slum conditions. By the time of self-governance in 1959 and 
independence  in  1965,  Singapore’s  leaders  realised  that  these  low-productivity  entrepôt 
activities (whose workers represented challenges and opportunities similar to those posed 
by the mass of disguisedly unemployed rural workers in most underdeveloped countries) 
offered only limited scope for a rapid acceleration of economic growth. The present report 
focuses on the period of major transformation, 1960-90, when Singapore was facing similar 
challenges to those being faced by China’s major cities today. 
 
Singapore’s  major  manufacturing  programme  of  the  early  1960s  demanded  that  new 
industrial areas be developed, with extensive new factory and office building. But it also 
required  large  new  housing  estates  and  towns  in  which  workers  could  live  in  less 
overcrowded conditions and closer to the new industries. Efforts were made to reserve 20-
25 percent of the land in the new towns for industrial purposes,  consistent with a cities-
within-the-city urban design, but this has not been entirely successful because the mix of 
jobs and residences has never been adequate and commuting has been heavy. However, 
this problem diminished over the years, particularly after the early 1980s when the provision 
of housing near to the huge Jurong industrial estate, built on reclaimed swampland, was 
massively increased and the transportation system improved. The Economic Development 
Board  (1961)  and  the  Jurong  Town  Council  (1968)  were  established  to  build  advance 
factories on cleared sites (mainly in Jurong but also in other parts of the island too), and to 
let these on attractive terms to foreign industrialists. 
 
4.1  The Housing Development Board 
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But the first and most important statutory body to be established, in February 1960, was the 
Housing Development Board (HDB), because massive investment in public housing was 
considered not a liability but a prerequisite to the overall development programme being 
planned. The HDB was given wide-ranging powers to acquire land and create self-contained 
new towns to house large numbers in high-rise apartments with related public buildings and 
services. Until 1974, when an independent Urban Renewal Authority (URA) was established, 
the HDB was also responsible for slum clearance and development of prime sites in the 
central business district (CBD). 
 
The HDB replaced the old Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT) that had been administered 
by the British Colonial Government between 1927-59. During that period the SIT had built 
only 27,000 public housing units and these housed only 9 percent of Singapore’s population. 
By  contrast,  between  1960-90  the  HDB  used  its  extensive  powers  and  resources  to 
complete  more  than  650,000  units  (plus  a  substantial  volume  of  related  facilities),  and 
rehoused more than 85% of the population (Sandilands 1992). 
 
Before 1960 the rate of new housing units constructed, mainly in the private sector, was 
falling far short of new family formations, with the result that the already acute problem of 
overcrowding was steadily worsening. The HDB initiated its activities with a five-year crash 
programme, 1960-65, when completion of public housing units increased from around 1,000 
units a year to an average of more than 10,000 a year (with a further 3,000 a year in the 
private sector for most of the period up to 1980, and about 5,000 a year after that). During 
1960-65 population pressure was growing by about 50,000 persons a year. This fell to less 
than 40,000 in the late 1960s and 1970s, yet the public housing programme accelerated to 
over 13,000 units a year between 1965-70; to nearly 23,000 a year between 1971-75; to 
27,500 a year between 1976-80; and to more than 40,000 a year between 1981-85 at a time 
when annual population growth increased to around 50,000 a year following a reversal of the 
earlier policy of population control. After 1985 there was some decline in public housing, with 
greater emphasis on renovation and remodelling. At the same time there was a big increase 
in the completion of higher-quality and larger private-sector homes, at nearly 5,000 a year. 
 
Thus, during this 30-year period the growth of the overall housing stock far outpaced the 
growth of the population, permitting a considerable amelioration of the overcrowding problem 
and progressive improvement in the quality of the stock. 
 
The initial emphasis by the HDB was on building small, rather basic apartments in high-rise 
blocks for rent to low-income families which, despite the low building costs (arising from 
scale economies), involved a heavy subsidy element. Rents were based on the premise that 
a family should not have to devote more than 20% of its budget to housing. But rich tenants 
paid the same rents as poor. Such a policy was clearly not feasible on a large scale, so the 
HDB had to establish strict eligibility rules in allocating apartments for rent and these rules 
were progressively tightened over the years (Sandilands 1992; Yuen 2007). Beginning in 
1964 after the most acute housing needs had been met, the HDB vigorously encouraged 
people to buy rather than rent. Thus, at the same time as the eligibility criteria for rental units 
were tightened, the eligibility criteria and terms for the sale of apartments were progressively 
relaxed. In this way there was always adequate real demand to match the expanding supply, 
and fiscal and monetary policy could almost always be kept under tight control.
21   
 
The thinking behind this “Home Ownership for the People” programme was that ownership 
gives  Singaporean  citizens  a  personal  stake  in  the  new  nation  and  fosters  a  sense  of 
nationhood. It can also be an effective way to increase the purposeful incentive to save (or, 
in Singapore’s case, to increase the willingness to accept a very high rate of compulsory 
                                                 
21 Despite one of the fastest rates of real economic growth in the world, 1960-2011, Singapore has 
also had one of the lowest average inflation rates. 19 
 
saving). And, critically, it reduces the amount of state subsidy that extensive application of a 
low-rent policy would imply. 
 
4.2  The Role of the Central Provident Fund (CPF) in the Financing of Public Housing 
 
In fact the ownership programme experienced a slow start. This was due (i) to the relatively 
small number of units offered for sale in the face of continued heavy demand for rental units; 
(ii) to the difficulty people had in raising the 20%  down-payment  requirement; and most 
importantly, (iii) to the relative scarcity of funds available for mortgage loans. A tremendous 
boost to the home ownership programme came in 1968 when applicants were permitted to 
utilise their accumulated pension fund contributions, under the Central Provident Fund (CPF) 
system, for both down-payments and monthly mortgage repayments for their HDB flats.
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The CPF was started in 1955 with employers and employees each contributing 5% of wages 
to the fund (but subject to a ceiling). By 1960 net contributions plus interest amounted to 
about 1.4% of GDP, almost all of which was invested in government securities. This aided 
the financing of development programmes including those of the HDB. Total expenditures on 
new housing in 1960 came to 2.9% of GDP, or 1.9% in value-added terms. (The value-
added contribution of the construction sector as a whole came to around 3.4% of GDP.)
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Rapid expansion of incomes and employment after 1960 boosted CPF savings but it was not 
until CPF rates were raised, in a series of steps beginning in 1968, that the increase in CPF 
savings  began  to  outpace  the  HDB  building  programme.  The  rates  for  employers  and 
employees were each raised to 8% in 1970. In that year CPF revenues exceeded the total of 
all public-sector building projects, including factories, offices, schools, and hospitals as well 
as housing. The HDB accounted for 71% of those public investments. Over the next 14 
years CPF contribution rates were increased until they each reached a remarkable peak of 
25%  of  gross  wages  (subject  to  a  ceiling).
24  These high  CPF rates go a long way to 
explaining the remarkable rise in the overall national savings rate that peaked at 45%  of 
GDP in 1990. In  view of the  country’s  usual  fiscal  conservatism,  with  the  public-sector 
budget normally in surplus, CPF revenues explain both Singapore’s relatively very low taxes 
and why the country could accumulate one of the largest foreign exchange reserves in the 
world, as a proportion of GDP, without inflationary consequences.    
 
Thus  the  CPF  has  performed  two  key  roles  in  Singapore’s  massive  housing  and  urban 
redevelopment programmes, one direct and the other indirect.  
 
The CPF’s indirect role lies in the forced capture of personal savings which are indirectly 
channelled to the HDB, Urban Renewal Authority (URA), Jurong Town Council (JTC) and 
other statutory boards through the government’s Development Fund (instead of this coming 
out of general taxation). The HDB has usually  obtained the lion’s share of these funds, 
loaned to it at rates of interest below market rates, though normally at a rate that exceeds 
the rate of inflation. Borrowers are charged only a slightly higher rate, and the government 
gives the HDB a subsidy to cover any cash deficit on its annual operating budget.  
                                                 
22 The mortgage repayment term was progressively extended from a maximum of 15 years before 
1970, to 20 years in 1970 and 25 years in 1986, thus increasing affordability and/or permitting the 
purchase of increasingly spacious homes on increasingly scarce, hence high-priced, land. 
23 Calculations in this section are mainly based on tables constructed by Sandilands (1992). 
24 This means, for example, that if the gross wage (before CPF contributions) is S$1,000 a month, the 
employer’s wage bill is S$1,250 and the employee’s CPF account is credited with S$500 in total. This 
is 40% of the wage of S$1,250 inclusive of the employer’s contribution.  
    It is interesting that when in 1985-86 the country faced a recession due to a squeeze on exports 
(resulting from a government-mandated high wage policy and a strongly appreciating exchange rate), 
the CPF rate was sharply cut from 25% to 15% for employers only. This quickly restored the country’s 
competitiveness and growth recovered.   20 
 
 
The CPF’s direct role is in permitting its members to use their CPF balances to buy their own 
homes.  Typically  the  down  payment  is made through  the  use  of  accumulated  balances, 
while  mortgage  debt  servicing  is  through  the  use  of  current  contributions.  Since  1981 
members  were  permitted  to  use  their  balances  to  purchase  private  as  well  as  HDB 
housing.
25  The acquisition of real estate wealth is seen as partly replacing the need for 
retirement pensions. 
 
By the late 1960s the share of the public and private construction sector as a whole in GDP 
(that is, in value added in the assembly of construction materials) had risen to nearly 10%, 
with gross expenditures (inclusive of bought-in inputs) between 15-20% of GDP, rising to 25-
30% in some later years. Gross expenditures on residential construction alone were around 
8 or 9% of GDP in the late 1960s and for most of the next 20 years. Thus not only was the 
rate of growth of construction above average (with h ousing a major component) but it 
became a significant proportion of GDP, thus fulfilling its role as a significant leading sector 
or motor of growth, apparently without in any way preventing the growth of an increasingly 
diversified export sector from fulfilling a similar (indeed complementary) role. The Singapore 
example indicates a strong symbiotic relationship between the two. 
 
4.3  Housing, land ownership, and the distribution of income 
 
We mentioned above the way in which a rapid growth of population and economic activity in 
the  cities  of  developing  countries  increases  the  demand  for  the  fixed  supply  of  space, 
especially in those locations where socially provided amenities are greatest. This puts strong 
upward pressure on the value of land in those areas, permitting great fortunes to be made by 
private individuals who have made little or no corresponding contribution to the creation of 
wealth.  Land  values  are  transfer  payments  that  divert  part  of  the  nation’s  output  from 
producers to the owners of land. 
 
Fortunately for its citizens, Singapore inherited large areas of public land from the British in 
1959,  but  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  of  1966  and  its  subsequent  amendments  gave  the 
government greatly increased powers of compulsory purchase, with compensation reflecting, 
at best, pre-existing use values only. By 1990, due largely to HDB land purchases (as well 
as substantial land reclamation by public bodies), the state was owner of around 75% of all 
of the land of the island.  
 
The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act greatly reduced the HDB’s financial requirements, 
and this is reflected in the relatively low selling prices of HDB flats, thereby spreading the 
social land value increases (often referred to as “unearned increments” in the literature) to a 
wider public. It should be noted, however, that purchasers do not acquire explicit private 
property rights in land, over which the HDB retains ownership and control, and which has 
been reported to have an average value of around 50%  of the market price of housing 
(Tyabji and Lin 1989). This is one reason why prices of HDB flats continue to diverge from 
those of similar units in the private sector, and the price differential is therefore only partly 
due to explicit cash subsidies (which are a very small proportion of total HDB operations).
26 
Also, unlike private sector housing, HDB flats are sold only on 99 -year leases, not freehold. 
                                                 
25 Not all of the funds can be used for purchase of housing. Some is retained in “Medisave” and 
“Edusave” accounts to pay for a proportion of educational and medical expenses. Withdrawals have 
also been permitted for the purchase of specified gilt-edged bonds.   
26 In fiscal 1985/86 the HDB introduced a new accounting convention in which the difference between 
the selling price of HDB flats and their market cost, inclusive of land, is recorded as a government 
subsidy. This made it appear that buyers of HDB flats were getting a subsidy of a third to a half of the 
purchase price, though given that ownership and control of land remains with the HDB, this may be 
an exaggeration.   21 
 
However, once families have bought their flats at a subsidised price, they benefit from future 
increases in the value of the land on which their flats stand, and they can benefit from these 
unearned increments when and if they come to sell in the future, except to the degree that 
annual property taxes, with regular updating of values, are imposed on owners. 
 
Of  equal  importance  for  the  absolute  increase  in  the  incomes  of  the  poorest  groups  in 
society – even if not for the relative improvement in their incomes – has been the sustained 
dynamism of the economy, due in no small part to the sustained dynamism of the housing 
sector.  For  this  has  ensured  more  or  less  full  employment  throughout  the  history  of 
Singapore’s independence, and the country’s very high (forced and voluntary) private and 
business savings have been invested productively in so much physical and human capital 
and technology as to ensure a steady rise in real wages even for the relatively unskilled. The 
reason  why  the  Gini  coefficient  of  relative  inequality  has  improved  less  rapidly  must, 
however, be due in no small measure to the way in which overall economic success is still 
largely reflected in the retention of spectacularly high land values in private hands. More 
could be done to ensure that even more of these pass to the government (and thence to the 
people as a whole in public benefits and/or lower taxes on earned incomes) than they do 
already. This would also help to reduce speculative holdings of land that have often been a 
significant cause of boom-and-bust land and business cycles. 
 
One final comment regarding the sharing of land values: in an effort to minimise the amount 
of land given over to the private car, as well as to reduce the problem of congested roads 
that would hamper the efficient conduct of business, the government introduced draconian 
restrictions on private car ownership in the early 1990s through the “certificate of entitlement” 
(COE) scheme. This involved the auctioning each month of licenses to purchase a new car, 
with the number of new licences issued determined by the government’s estimate of the 
increase in the carrying capacity of the island’s road network (roughly by 1% a year). This 
resulted in very big and growing excess demand for COEs that drove the price of cars to 
more  than  four  times  the  world  market  price.  This  was  effectively  a  way  to  sell  or  rent 
valuable land given over to roads) to richer Singaporeans so that they, rather than those 
without cars, paid for the roads, but also subsidised the improvement of public transport for 
all. (In addition the road space in the central business district was also subject to very high 
daily charges.)  
 
4.4  The construction sector and exogenous shocks  
 
Singapore is one of the most open economies in the world and is therefore peculiarly subject 
to global economic crises  that adversely affect its ability to sell to the world, generating 
recession, notably during the 1997 Asian crisis and the current 2007-11 crisis. Occasionally 
recessions  have  had  home-grown  causes,  notably  in  1985-86.  This  resulted  from  a 
combination of (i) artificially high wage increases mandated by the Singapore Wages Council 
in their misguided view that this would stimulate a faster rate of labour-saving productivity 
increases but which, coupled with an informal exchange rate peg to the US dollar that was 
experiencing an unusually strong appreciation at that time, instead led to a strongly over-
valued real exchange rate  that jeopardised Singapore’s export competitiveness,  together 
with (ii) a speculative frenzy of new office and hotel building led to over-capacity that could 
not be sold at prices that covered the private sector’s building and land costs.  
 
These two causes were inter-related in that the loss of export markets led to an exodus of 
the foreign workers and business men and women who had been sustaining the demand for 
land and accommodation of all kinds, including hotels, private sector housing, and office 
space. The leading sectors of exports and construction in those years both led down instead 
of  up.  Fortunately,  the  government  responded  quickly  by  cutting  the  artificial  (hence 
unsupportable) increases in wage costs via a 10 percentage point cut in employers’ CPF 22 
 
contributions (as mentioned above), and there was a rapid recovery both in exports and in 
the related demand for space and building. 
 
In other years of crisis for the trade sector, Singapore has been able to rely on its second 
leading sector of construction to compensate.  
 
5.   Lessons for China 
 
The above accounts of Colombian and Singaporean experiences offer positive and negative 
lessons for China in respect of the role of the construction sector in general and residential 
construction  in  particular  in  boosting  the  self-sustainable  rate  of  economic  growth.  We 
conclude with a brief list. 
 
1.  The experience of Colombia and Singapore both demonstrate the immense importance 
of  a  government-assisted  boost  to  the  residential  housing  sector  and  related 
infrastructure and services in the acceleration of their overall economic development. 
This is vital for the geographical and occupational mobility of the work force so that 
labour productivity can be maximised and the distribution of income improved. 
 
2.  Housing and related infrastructure rely much more heavily than other sectors on long-
term finance out of external funds. They are therefore much more heavily affected by 
variations in the rate of interest than is shorter-term finance for working capital (much of 
which  anyway  comes  from  internal  ploughback  of  business  profits  and  depreciation 
accounts)  or  consumer  credit  (which  generally  has  a  lower  social  value).  This  is 
because nominal interest rate tends to vary with inflation, but often not immediately in 
tandem with it. This then adversely affects the incentive to save if real rates fall, while 
also  adversely  affecting  the  demand  for  long-term  finance  of  the  higher  “front-end 
loading” problem for borrowers. It therefore merits special protection. 
 
3.  It is vital that the discrimination against long-term finance be offset by measures that 
both encourage saving and ensure that housing finance gets a share of total savings 
that reflects the relatively high private and social return on private and public housing. 
Both the voluntary Colombian CAV and the compulsory Singaporean CPF systems – 
especially the latter – have done much to boost the supply of savings channelled to 
housing. China has copied the Singaporean CPF system (with its close links with the 
Housing Development Board) through its own national Housing Provident Fund (HPF) 
system  introduced  in  1994.  However,  the  coverage  is  more  limited  and  monthly 
employee and employer contributions to the Fund much more modest than in Singapore 
(see Lan Deng et al, 2011). These could be increased significantly as a non-inflationary 
additional source of funds, especially if its administration can be made as efficient as in 
Singapore. 
 
4.  The more that is done to boost voluntary and forced saving, the less the pressure on 
inflationary sources of funds. This message is particularly apt today, at a time when 
inflation  has  been  accelerating  in  China  (and  is  being  partly  suppressed  via  price 
controls rather than a tightening of monetary policy). 
 
5.  In view of the external social benefits of a well housed population and the desirability of 
a good social mix (reduction in social segregation) there is a case for subsidies, though 
budgetary constraints limit the role that subsidies can play in ensuring dynamic growth 
as compared to institutional reforms that boost non-inflationary private savings.  
 
6.  The provision of housing should be matched to real effective demand. The schedule of 
long-term  mortgage  repayments  on  good-quality  new  housing  can  be  made  more 
affordable if inflation and nominal interest rates are kept low or if index-linked finance 23 
 
can  be  introduced  to  overcome  the  front-end  loading  problem,  and  if  mortgage 
amortisation terms can be lengthened. 
 
7.  China should avoid building new housing directly for the very poor because only by 
building extremely basic structures can the costs be covered by rents that the very poor 
can afford. Thus these programmes would require prohibitive subsidies and would do 
little to improve slum conditions on cheap (because poorly located) land.  
 
8.  The indirect approach to the solution to the most pressing housing conditions of the very 
poor  is  likely  to  be  more  successful.  But  this  requires  that  China  ensures  that  the 
number of conventionally built apartments with minimum space and quality standards is 
at least as great as the number of new family units being formed each year in its cities 
where  the  greatest  opportunities  for  higher  productivity  employment  lie.  As  Currie 
(1976:63) explained the potential benefits of the “escalation” or “filtering-down” process: 
   Elements  in  the  supply-demand  problem  become  not  the  proportion  of  the 
population unable to afford new housing, but rather whether there are sufficient funds 
and physical resources on the one hand and sufficient demand on the other to result 
in a sufficient addition to the stock of housing to match the new households required 
each  year  so  that  all  the  new  housing  may  be  conventionally  built  in  a  modern 
construction sector, may be well located in relation to employment, and may be well 
serviced. This converts the problem into one of available funds and the terms on 
which apartments may be rented, and the growth of incomes and effective demand 
for apartments, and the question who receives and who pays the transfer payments 
arising from the rise in land values… 
    …A  secret  of  the  success  of  Singapore  of  supplying  conventionally  built 
apartments  for  an  increasing  proportion  of  the  population  at  astonishingly  low 
percentages of their income can be found in large-volume, low cost, high-density 
(which spreads land costs), modest initial sized apartments, rapidly rising incomes 
and  finally  some  subsidy  to  the  whole  operation  by  central  government.  This 
combination has permitted not only slums to be replaced but also a steady upgrading 
in space and facility standards. 
 
9.  There should be explicit recognition that investment in housing is at least as productive 
as any other investment
27 if the potential real effective demand  for it can be actualised 
via the mobilisation of real non -inflationary savings channelled toward that effective 
demand, supplemented by subsidies to poorer families to the extent affordable out of 
central and local municipal budgets.  
 
10. The  promotion  of  the   construction  sector  complements  industrialisation .  If 
industrialisation hits a recession due to a downturn in the global economy or because of 
pressure to revalue the renmimbi, there are non-inflationary ways in which demand can 
be further reoriented toward housing and related infrastructure to compensate. This is 
especially feasible for a country like China in possession of huge foreign exchange 
reserves. 
 
11. Urban design should foster increased density to economise on increasingly scarce, 
hence high-value land. This can be helped by  tough measures to restrict the growth of 
private car ownership, with revenues raised from the taxation of car ownership used to 
subsidise better public transport. 
 
                                                 
27 Contrary to Echeverry [2002] who is discussed in the appendix; or Gao [2010:5] who notes 
that  housing  in  China  has  been  regarded  as  a  “consumption  item”,  and  contrasts  the 
“productive sector in state investment” with the “dead-end nature of housing expenditure.” 24 
 
12. Increased  urbanisation  everywhere  goes  hand-in-hand  with  rapidly  rising  urban  land 
values. This is one of the main sources of increasingly unequal distribution of incomes 
and wealth. The socially created increases in these land values should be returned to 
the whole community via its recapture by the government on behalf of the community as 
a  whole  that  has  created  these  transfer  payments.  Governments  should  avoid  the 
opposite scenario: capture of government at various levels, central and municipal, by 
the  vested  interests  of  a  new  landed  aristocracy,  including  through  bribery  and 







I am appending my review
28 of the following book because it may reinforce my explanation 
why housing and urban infrastructure deserves special protection in a strategy to accelerate 
overall development, and why it should not be regarded as “unproductive” compared to other 




Juan Carlos Echeverry, Las Claves del Futuro: Economía y Conflicto en Colombia. (Keys to 
the Future: Economics and Conflict in Colombia.) Bogota: Editorial Oveja Negra, 2002, 
pp.xxii + 440. 
  
This book represents the thought and experience of a prominent economist who directed 
Colombia’s National Planning Department (DNP) during the crisis years of 1998-2002. Upon 
demitting  office  with  the  change  of  government  in  August  2002,  Juan  Carlos  Echeverry 
assumed the post of Dean of the Faculty of Economics at the prestigious University of the 
Andes where he continues to exercise great influence on students and economic policy-
makers. His book surveys the evolution of the Colombian economy over the past 30 years, 
with a focus on the last decade during which time Colombia embarked upon an ambitious 
programme of “apertura”, or openness.  
 
Echeverry notes that he was a member of the team that negotiated with the IMF, and was 
basically sympathetic to the “Washington consensus” that stressed “fiscal health” (smaller 
deficits), privatisation, financial liberalisation, central bank independence, and tax, pension, 
and labour-market reforms. He laments that the vicious and very costly “narco-guerrilla war” 
that Colombia has suffered during this period has greatly offset the benefits of allegedly 
sound economic policy, and has given liberalisation an undeserved bad name.  
 
The appearance of Las Claves del Futuro (The Keys to the Future) in Colombia is very 
timely. It almost coincided with the publicity surrounding the celebration of the centenary of 
the birth of another economist who achieved great prominence as a teacher and practitioner 
in Colombia: Lauchlin Currie (1902-93). After a distinguished career at Harvard, the Federal 
Reserve Board,  and in  the White House as Franklin Roosevelt’s economic adviser  from 
1939-45,  Currie  came  to  Colombia  as  head  of  a  World  Bank  mission  in  1949  (see 
Sandilands,  1990,  and  Laidler  and  Sandilands,  2002).  He  was  invited  to  stay  on  as  an 
adviser to successive governments for the next 40 years. Most notably he was the father of 
a unique index-linked housing finance system (known in Colombia by its Spanish acronym, 
UPAC, for “unit of constant purchasing power”) which he stoutly defended from its birth in 
1972 until his own death in December 1993. 
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Echeverry gives considerable space to an analysis of that innovative but highly controversial 
housing finance system. He notes that its main original aim was to make construction a 
“leading” sector that could permanently boost the overall economic growth rate (as explained 
in detail in Currie, 1974). In 2002 the system lay in ruins, the victim of countless debilitating 
modifications. Construction had for the past four years been leading the economy down 
instead  of  up.  Many  thousands  had  lost  their  jobs,  both  directly  and  as  a  result  of  the 
depressed state of the industries that supply the construction sector. Urban unemployment 
stood  at  18  percent,  with  the  official  figure  for  urban  underemployment  standing  at  33 
percent.  In  other  words,  only  half  of  the  workforce  was  fully  employed  (rural 
underemployment was worse than the urban rate.) 
 
The two directors of the National Planning Department who implemented Currie’s celebrated 
Plan de las Cuatro Estrategias (Plan of the Four Strategies) between 1971 and 1974 were 
Roberto Arenas and Luis Eduardo Rosas. At the Currie centenary in October 2002 both 
recalled the great impulse that UPAC had given to construction and to overall growth in the 
1970s, together with full employment and improved distribution. Comparing the dynamism of 
the 1970s with the stagnation of today, Rosas remarked, in a newspaper tribute to Currie: 
“!Como nos hace de falta en estos momentos!” (“How we have need of him now!”) 
 
Echeverry concedes that in the 1970s and 1980s construction played a very positive role. It 
created  jobs  and  was  a  contra-cyclical  influence.  But  he  claims  that  in  the  1990s,  with 
“apertura” (the policy of economic openness) and the great influx of external credits and drug 
money, construction became a pro-cyclical speculative activity that was bound to collapse, 
as collapse it did in 1998 – though he stressed that the problem was compounded by the 
fiscal strain of a worsening civil war. His main complaint is that construction is a sector that 
has been privileged and has diverted resources from traded goods. It also relies on unskilled 
workers whereas the future depends on skills and an allocation of resources more in tune 
with the market forces that Adam Smith emphasised. Let us rely on Smith, says Echeverry, 
not on protectionist “models of development” and privileged “leading sectors”. 
 
However, Currie’s ideas were also heavily influenced by Smith. Currie’s mentor at Harvard in 
the 1920s was Allyn Young, whose presidential address to the British Association in 1928 on 
“Increasing  Returns  and  Economic  Progress”  (Young,  1928)  has  inspired  modern 
development theory, to which Currie has been an interesting contributor (see, for example, 
Currie, 1997). Echeverry does not refer to this so-called endogenous growth theory, perhaps 
because of his profound scepticism of “models of development”. But Young and Currie were 
inspired by the opening chapters of The Wealth of Nations where Smith emphasised that the 
key to increased productivity was specialization or the division of labour. And the division of 
labour in turn depended upon the size of the market, or upon real demand.  
 
Today demand management is generally associated with Keynesian policies to tackle short-
run  business  cycles  around  a  secular  trend.  These  cycles  are  closely  associated  with 
interruptions to the flow of monetary incomes and expenditures (or monetary demand). But 
Smith and Young focussed on competition, openness, and the mobility of labour to increase 
the underlying trend of real demand and market size (or what Smith also called “the power of 
exchanging”), hence specialization, hence productivity. 
 
Young explained that in the modern economy specialization takes the form of new, more 
specialized firms and industries that compete against the old. They introduce new forms of 
organization and technology, but only as and when it pays to do so. The larger the market 
size, the greater the incentive to innovate. Currie extended this idea to show that the existing 
growth  rate  (of  the  overall  market,  or  GDP)  had  a  tendency  to  perpetuate  itself.  But  in 
Colombia where resources were abundant but grossly malallocated and underutilized, and 
where labour mobility was very poor, growth fell far short of potential. This self-perpetuating 26 
 
(or endogenous) growth rate was a vicious circle that could best be broken by institutional 
measures to liberate the great potential supply.  
 
This  is  where  Currie’s  vision  of  construction’s  potential  role  goes  rather  further  than 
Echeverry’s. As a “leading sector” it is valuable not so much as a contra-cyclical, stabilizing 
force (though it could also serve that purpose). Rather, it could help Colombia (and other 
countries) to break free of her historically slow, endogenous growth path. It is a leading 
sector because (a) it is an important direct and indirect component of GDP, so its growth has 
a significant effect on overall growth; (b) it moves independently of movements in the rest of 
the economy, and can be moved exogenously through discretionary policies; (c) it plays a 
vital role in promoting labour mobility; and (d) it is a sector with enormous latent demand.  
 
But in the past this latent demand had been severely repressed. Potential homeowners can 
usually only buy a home with the help of substantial mortgages. Thus effective demand 
required  a  rapidly  expanding flow  of  credit  on  convenient  terms. This  was  not  available 
because chronic inflation discriminated against housing finance. High inflation requires high 
interest rates to attract savings. But for  people borrowing large sums high interest rates 
impose  a  severe  cash-flow  problem  in  the  short  term  (the  so-called  “front-end  loading 
problem”). This curtails effective demand. By contrast, “constant value” savings and loans 
made it both more attractive to save and easier to borrow. 
 
Echeverry is a stout opponent of inflationary finance. But in Colombia chronic inflation has 
been a reality for the past 50 years. Echeverry fails to highlight the main distortionary effects 
that inflation introduces. In practice some sectors suffer far greater harm than others. The 
disadvantaged  sectors  –  mainly  construction  and  exports  -  are  not  “privileged”  when 
measures are introduced (such as UPAC and realistic exchange rate policies) that protect 
them  from  the  distortions  of  inflation.  Furthermore,  conventional  macroeconomic  policies 
designed to squeeze inflation out of the system (through temporarily higher interest rates on 
government bonds) and to reduce the fiscal deficit (much of it due to depressed incomes) 
can also damage the housing sector by making it less attractive to place savings there.  
 
Currie understood how to combine deflationary monetary and fiscal policies with policies to 
reactivate the real economy by redirecting incomes and expenditures toward leading sectors 
that rely not on the printing press but upon genuine savings. The great economist Harry G 
Johnson similarly distinguished between “expenditure-reducing” and “expenditure-switching” 
policies  (Johnson,  1958).  A  blueprint  for  such  a  combination,  with  detailed  quantitative 
estimates of the size of the required “compensatory” effect required of the leading sectors, 
was drawn up by Currie and Alvaro Montenegro (1984) as advice for the administration of 
President Belisario Betancur in the mid-1980s. The advice was not taken and the country 
went through a very bad bout of instability and capital flight. 
 
The  construction  sector  has  another  very  important  role  ignored  by  Echeverry:  it  is  an 
indispensable  element  in  the  labour  mobility  mechanism.  This  promotes  not  only  faster 
growth  but  also  better  distribution.  In  Colombia  there  is  still  a  great  imbalance  in  the 
allocation of labour, notably between low-paying agriculture and high-paying urban activities. 
And in cities like Bogota there is urgent need for better balance between where people live 
and where they work, and for an improvement in the quality of the housing needed and/or 
demanded by all income groups. 
 
Echeverry claims there is a conflict between investment in internationally traded goods and 
investment in housing. Yet  in countries such as Singapore, noted for spectacular  export 
growth, investment in housing has also been enormous, and far greater than in Colombia. 
Despite re-housing almost the entire population in the last 35 years its construction sector 
still booms. There has been no saturation of demand. 
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As people’s incomes have increased so Singaporeans have demanded better and better 
accommodation and related infrastructure. This has been aided by low inflation and large 
pension fund contributions that are released for housing finance at low rates of interest (but 
positive in real terms). Building is concentrated on well-built conventional high-rise blocks for 
the middle classes. As these families move into new homes lower-income families move into 
the ones they have vacated. This “filtration” or “escalation” process enables poorer families 
to enjoy far better accommodation than the type of subsidised “vivienda de interes social” 
(popular housing) that Colombia is desperately trying to provide today out of limited fiscal 
resources. 
 
Housing and exports are complements, not substitutes. Both are capable of expanding on 
the basis of a stimulus to and redirection of real savings, rather than via inflationary finance 
or subsidies. Here are the real “keys to the future”.  
 
By contrast, Echeverry’s overview of the Colombian economy and economic policies during 
the last 30 years focuses mainly on the structure and balance of the national budget and the 
rate of growth of money and credit. This is rather typical too of the focus of the international 
lending agencies when drawing up conditions for further foreign loans. There is much of 
value  in  this  analysis.  However,  its  key  limitation  is  that  it  gives  too  little  weight  to  the 
dynamic  changes  in  the  composition  of  real  incomes  and  expenditures  over  time  in 
developing countries like Colombia, and of the need to ensure that the country’s abundant 
natural  and  human  resources  are  allocated  –  and  reallocated  –  accordingly.  Herein  the 
supreme importance of the mobility mechanism, and of the related role of a dynamic and 
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